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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented for review are the following:
1.

Did the district court err in including the husband's 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)

social security substitute account in the marital estate while excluding the wife's social
security account? The issue presented is one of first impression in the State of Utah.
It is a pure question of law, and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 936 (Utah 1994).
2.

Was the finding of the district court that the husband acted fraudulently

in making gifts to the minor children during the marriage supported by clear and
convincing evidence? The issue presented challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,
and the standard of review is whether the factual determination of the district court
was clearly erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
3.

Did the district court err in voiding completed gifts of the husband during

tlie marriage to the parties' minor children who were not parties to tlie action and who
were not before the court in their capacity as owners of property? Tlie issue presented

1

is a pure question of law, and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
936 (Utah 1994).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah R. Civ. P. 19 and the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United
States, Amendment V, and of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, are
determinative of the third issue. {See Addendum A, Determinative Constitutional
Provisions and Rule.) There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules or regulations which are determinative of either of the other issues on appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition below.
This was an action for divorce brought by the wife following a twenty year

marriage. Afinaldecree of divorce was entered May 25,1994, by the Second District
Court, Judge Rodney S. Page. {See Addendum B, Decree of Divorce.) No post-trial
motions were filed. The Notice of Appeal was filed June 23,1994.
2.

Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review.
General Background Facts Relevant to All Issues. Appellant Wilbur R.

Jefferies and appellee Ruth Ann Jefferies, residents of Davis Comity, were married

2

November 10, 1973. Findings of Fact, f 2, R.1106; see Addendum C. Two cliildren
were bom of the marriage, Nicole L. Jefferies, born on January 7, 1977, and Lon Mark
Jefferies, born May 7, 1980. Findings of Fact, \ 4, R.1106; see Addendum C. On
May 25, 1994, Second District Judge Rodney S. Page awarded each of the parties a
Decree of Divorcefromthe other on grounds of irreconcilable differences. Decree of
Divorce, R.1128, see Addendum B.
Facts Relevant to First Issue. The husband has been an employee of the
Wasatch Front Regional Council, an inter-governmental agency (the "Council") since
1972 and its Executive Director since 1976. Defendant's Exhibit 34, R.73-74, 753754. As an employee of the Council, he participated in a retirement program,
including a plan implemented pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (the "Section 401(a)
Plan") which was offered and administered by the Council in lieu of participation in
the federal social security system. By virtue of his election to participate in the
Council's retirement program, he has no claim to federal social security benefits.
R.661.
Facts Relevant to Second and Third Issues. During the marriage, beginning in
1980, the husband made gifts to the children totalling approximately $145,725 in the
form of deposits to trading accounts established in their respective names at Dean
Witter Reynolds and at Shearson pursuant to the Utah Uniform Gifts to Minors Act,
3

Utah Code Ann. §§75-5-601-75-5-610(1978). R.631-632, 1033-1036, 999, 1048,
1055-1056, Addendum D. The husband made regular deposits to these accounts, and
in no year did he make contributions in excess of $10,000 per recipient, the tliresliliold
which would have triggered the duty to file a federal gift tax return. R.999, 1048.
Although the wife conceded that she knew of the existence (but not the amount) of
these accounts,1 the district court determined that the "deposits were made by [the
husband] without the knowledge of [the wife]" and that they were "fraudulent and
were an attempt by [the husband] to hide assetsfrom[the wife] and transfer them to
the parties' children under his control." Findings of Fact, f 25, R.1112; see
Addendum C. The district court held that the transfers were void, and ordered the
children's accounts to be included in the marital estate. Decree of Divorce, f 15,
R.1131, Addendum B. The only evidence of concealment of the accounts, other than
the wife's testimony that she was ignorant of their existence, was the fact that the
account statements at the time of trial were being sent to the husband at a post office
box. R.1035-1036.

'In response to a question by Mr. Dolowitz, "Did Wil ever discuss putting
money away in accounts for children with you?", the wife responded, "In the
beginning of the marriage, small amounts, but never the large amounts that are in
those accounts currently." R.1055.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although retirement benefits generally are marital property and thus included
in the marital estate, federal social security benefits are not. The courts have, with but
few exceptions, excluded social security benefitsfromthe marital estate on the basis
that they are not property at all, but a form of "social insurance". In cases, such as this
one, where one of the divorcing spouses is covered by a public retirement plan in lieu
of social security, it is manifestly inequitable to include that spouse's public retirement
plan benefits in the marital estate while excluding the social security benefits of the
other spouse. The inclusion by the district court of the husband's Section 401(a) Plan
benefits (offered by his employer in lieu of federal social security benefits) thus
violates Utah law requiring the equitable distribution of marital property. If allowed
to stand, the decision of the district court would award to the wife all of her retirement
benefits and one-half of the husband's, hardly an equitable result.
The minor children of the parties were not before the court in their capacity as
owners of the trading accounts at Dean Witter Reynolds and Shearson established by
the husband for their use and benefit. The action of the district court voiding those
accounts and declaring the funds deposited in the accounts to be marital property and
includable in the marital estate violated both the rules requiring the joinder of

5

necessary parties and consitutional prohibitions against depriving persons of property
without due process of law.
Thefindingof the district court that deposits by the husband to trading accounts
in the names of the minor children werefraudulentand therefore void, requiring that
the funds be included in the marital estate, was not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. When the evidence in favor of the finding of fraud is marshaled as required
on appeal, it is apparent that of the several elements of fraud required to be proven
under Utah law, none is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The wife
conceded knowledge of the husband's intention to establish the children's accounts
and, while the account statements were initally sent to the home but later sent to the
husband at a post office box, such a change of address cannot be deemed concealment
by the husband nor, without more, evidence of fraud. Against the court's finding was
evidence that the accounts were first established in 1980, long before the breakdown
of the marriage, and that they were enhanced by a series of more or less regular
deposits over the intervening thirteen years.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY INCLUDING THE
HUSBAND'S 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) SOCIAL SECURITY
SUBSTITUTE ACCOUNT IN THE MARITAL ESTATE
WHILE EXCLUDING THE WIFE'S SOCIAL SECURITY
ACCOUNT.
The issue of whether retirement benefits to be received in lieu of federal social
security benefits are includable in the marital estate is one of first impression in the
state of Utah and has been considered by only a handful of other jurisdictions.
Accordingly, it is appropriatefirstto consider the law relating to retirement benefits
generally and to social security benefits in particular.
1.

Retirement benefits are normally includable in the marital estate. The

Utah cases are consistent with those from most other jurisdictions in holding that
"[retirement benefits accrued during marriage must normally be 'considered a marital
asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.'" Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,
1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), citing Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) and Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); accord,
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431,433-434 (Utah 1982); see annotation, Pension
or Retirement Benefits as Subject to Award or Division by Court in Settlement of
Property Rights Between Spouses, 94 ALR3d 176 (1979).
7

2.

Social security benefits are not property until received and therefore

cannot be an asset of the marital estate. The includability of social security benefits
in the marital estate has not been extensively considered in the Utah cases. The only
reported Utah judicial pronouncement on whether social security benefits are marital
property is the following single sentence found in the court's "Summary" in Burt: "All
retirement benefits, including defendant's Social Security and possibly her IRA, are
marital property and must be divided accordingly." Burt at 1171.2
The Burt dictum thus departs, without analysis or citation of authority, from
the rule almost universally recognized in other jurisdictions to the effect that social
security benefits to be received following the dissolution of a marriage are not a form
of deferred compensation, nor a species of property, and are not therefore includable
in, nor divisable as a part of, the marital estate. Luna v. Luna, 608 P.2d 57, 60 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1979); cf. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413,93 S.Ct.
590, 34 L.Ed.2d 608 (1973) ("[42 U.S.C. § 407] imposes a broad bar against the use
of any legal process to reach all social security benefits.").3

^ e Burts had both retired; and the defendant, the only party entitled to social
security benefits, was currently receiving such benefits at the time of trial. The rule
thus pronounced is arguably dictum as to cases in which the party entitled to social
security benefits has not yet retired.
3

The federal statute cited in Philpott, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), provides:
8

In holding that such benefits are not property subject to division but, rather,
constitute a "public benefit that... does not create either contract or property rights",
the courts in community property states have noted that interference with social
security benefits would violate the supremacy clause of the federal constitution.
Sherry v. Sherry, 701 P.2d 265,270 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); In re Marriage of Cohen,
105 Cal.App.3d 836, 164 Cal.Rptr. 672 (1980); In re Marriage of Nizenkoff, 65
Cal.App.3d 136, 135 Cal.Rptr. 189 (1976); cf Larango v. Larango, 610 P.2d 907
(Wash. 1980) (federal railroad retirement benefits).
Social security benefits are simply not a species of property, since, unlike
typical retirement plans, the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397, does not
confer any vested propertyrightat any time prior to payment of benefits. Fleming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960) ("To engraft upon the
Social Security system a concept of'accrued propertyrights'would deprive it of the
flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands",
id., 80 S.Ct. 1372); Sherry, 701 P.2d 270. The Act, in fact, expressly reserves to the
The right of any person to any future payment under this
subchapter [the Social Security Act (1935), as amended]
shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity,
and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing
under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the
operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
9

Congress therightto amend or repeal its provisions or to terminate die social security
program altogether. 42 U.S.C. § 1304.4
3.

The husband's Section 401(a) Plan benefits are a substitute for social

•security benefits and should not therefore be included in the marital estate. By
including the husband's Section 401(a) Plan benefits, but not the wife's social security
benefits, in the marital estate, the trial court violated the fundamental principle of
equitable distribution embodied in Utah law.5 Although the includability of social
security substitutes in the marital estate has not been widely considered, and although
the few reported cases are divided,6 the principle of equitable distribution suggests that
those decisions which have held that social security substitutes should be excluded
represent much the better view. Thus, in Schneeman v. Schneeman, 615 A.2d 1369
(Pa. Super. 1992), a case in which the husband, a Pennsylvania state trooper, had

4

"The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby
reserved to the Congress."
5

"Each party is . . . presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property
and fifty percent of the marital property." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
6

Loudermilkv. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905 (W.Va. 1990), and Olson v. Olson,
445 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1989), appear to be the only reported cases holding retirement
benefits in lieu of social security includable in the marital estate. Both cases rest on
the doubtful proposition that, as social security benefits are in the contemplation of
federal law not property and therefore not includable in the marital estate, the resulting
inequity is not within the power of state courts to rectify.

10

contributed to the State Employee Retirement System in lieu of contributions to the
social security system, the court held that, "[i]n order to similarly situate appellant
with other employee-spouses, his pension must be offset by the amount he would have
contributed to the Social Security system." Id. at 1375, citing Endy v. Endy, 603 A.2d
641, 644 (Pa. Super. 1992) ("to the extent part of the pension might figuratively be
considered in place of a social security benefit, that portion should be excluded from
the marital estate") and Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. Super. 1990).
A Florida court has reached the same result in Bain v. Bain, 553 So.2d 1389, 1392
(Florida Ct. App. 1990). As the court there observed,
If a trial court awards 25% or 50% of this [public
retirement in lieu of social security] plan to the nonemployee spouse, the non-employee spouse could also
receive social security payments under his or her own
earnings record where applicable. The result is inequitable
because it produces a windfall for the non-employee
spouse.
And an Ohio court has effectively reached the same result by including in the marital
estate only that "portion of the public pension . . . earned by the exempt spouse that
exceeds the present value of the Social Security benefits actually earned by the other
spouse." Coats v. Coats, 626 N.E.2d 707, 708 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Dom. Rel. Div. 1993).
Applying the reasoning in these cases to the present case, the trial court should,
at a minimum, have excluded from the marital estate that portion of the husband's
11

Section 401(a) Plan benefits which was equivalent to the social security benefits
which he would have received but for his participation in the Section 401(a) Plan.
Moreover, because the amount of the husband's retirement benefits is subject to
various contingencies, the trial court should be directed, on remand, to postpone
distribution of the wife's share of those benefits at least until the benefits are received,
as suggested by this court in Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

12

POINT n.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY VOIDING THE
HUSBAND'S COMPLETED GIFTS DURING THE
MARRIAGE TO THE MINOR CHILDREN BECAUSE
THEY WERE NOT PARTIES TO THIS ACTION AND
WERE NOT BEFORE THE COURT IN THEIR
CAPACITY AS OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY.
The decree of the district court, to the extent it purports to declare the children's
interests in the brokerage accounts void and to dispose of those interests in their
absence, is itself void (i) since the children, though not parties to the action, were
necessary parties for this purpose within the applicable procedural rule, who could
have been and were required to be joined, (ii) since the purported disposition of their
property without providing them notice and opportunity to be heard violated their
rights of due process, and (iii) since the court did not have jurisdiction to dispose of
property rights of parties not before the court.
1.

The children were necessary parties to any proceeding to terminate their

interests in the brokerage accounts. Utah R. Civ. P. 19, provides in relevant part that
one who is
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the
13

subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in his absence may . . . as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest....
Emphasis added. Failure to join such a party may be raised at any time, including for
the first time on appeal. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), affd. sub nom. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). That
the minor children of the marriage satisfy both branches of the Rule 19(a) test cannot
be doubted. In their absence, "complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties" since their unresolved interests in the brokerage accounts make
impossible a final determination of the scope of the marital estate in dispute between
the husband and wife; and the disposition of those interests in their absence clearly
"impair[s] or impedefs] [their] ability to protect that interest". They are therefore
"necessary" parties who "shall" be joined under subsection (a).7
2.

The decree operates to deprive the parties' children of property without

due process of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 19 is rooted in the fundamental policy of both the
Constitution of the United States, Article V, and the Constitution of Utah, Article I,
Section 7, that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." It is well established that the minimum content of due process is both
'Because joinder of the children is mandatory under subsection (a) of the rule,
it is unnecessary to demonstrate that they are also "indispensable" parties under
subsection (b), though they undoubtedly are.
14

notice and an opportunity to be heard. State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) ("Not only does the Fifth Amendment require notice and a hearing, but
it requires that the state not deprive citizens of their property .. .without a valid legal
basis.").
In our judicial system, except in extraordinary
circumstances that are not present here, all parties are
entitled to notice that a particular issue is being considered
by a court and to an opportunity to present evidence and
argument on that issue before decision. The failure to give
adequate notice and opportunity to participate can
constitute a denial of due process under article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution.
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990).
It is undisputed that the children of the parties, ages 13 and 17 at the time of
trial, were not represented in person or by counsel in the proceeding to divest them of
their property and were given no opportunity whatsoever to be heard on that issue.
A clearer case of denial of due process cannot be imagined.
3.

The district court was without jurisdiction to terminate the rights of the

children in the brokerage accounts, since they were not before the court in their
capacity as property owners.

The Utah courts have recognized that, absent

intervention, the only parties to a divorce action are the husband and wife, and that "a
divorce action deals only with rights as between the parties to the marriage and does
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not operate to assert therightsof a third party." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843,
850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thus, Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah
1981), where the husband and wife had, prior to the divorce, established a trust for the
children, held that the divorce court was not authorized "to alter property rights
already vested in other parties, such as in the children who are the beneficiaries of the
trust in the income already received and deposited in the trust account." Such is
precisely the case here. The husband made completed gifts to the children prior to the
divorce action. Under the terms of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, such a gift is
"irrevocable" and "conveys to the minor indefeasibly vested legal title to the
[property]". Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-603(1) (1978). Thus, within the rule of Sundquist,
the district court was without authority to alter the vested interests of the children in
the brokerage accounts since they were not parties to the action. The ruling of the
court purporting to do so is therefore a nullity.
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POINT III.
THE FINDING OF THE DISTRICT COURT THAT THE
HUSBAND ACTED FRAUDULENTLY IN MAKING
GIFTS TO THE MINOR CHILDREN DURING THE
MARRIAGE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
1.

The trial court voided the husband's gifts to the parties' minor children

based on a defective finding of fraud. The trial court required that the brokerage
accounts in the name of the parties' children be included in the marital estate, based
upon the following finding:
25. During the marriage, approximately
$145,725.00 was placed in accounts at Dean Witter
Reynolds in the children's names pursuant to the Uniform
Gift to Minors Act. The court has determined that those
deposits were made by the Defendant without the
knowledge of the Plaintiff. They werefraudulentand were
an attempt by the Defendant to hide assets from the
Plaintiff and transfer them to the parties' children under his
control. As such they werefraudulent,not only upon the
Plaintiff, but also upon the marital estate. These transfers
are void and the monies are considered to be and are ruled
to be part of the marital estate.
Findings of Fact, f 25, R.1112, Addendum C. Thefindingis clearly conclusory and
lacks sufficient specificity to permit identification of the specific facts evidencing the
several elements of fraud. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(conclusory findings "constitute reversible error unless the facts in the record are
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'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment."'), citing Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983); Romrell v.
Zions First National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 394-395 (Utah 1980) ("Failure of the
trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error.").
2.

The evidence supporting the finding of fraud, when marshaled, is

inconclusive. The only evidence by the wife which might support the finding,
marshaled as required by, e.g., Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) and Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199 (Utah 1991), consists of the
following testimony {see Addendum D, Extracts from Record Referred to in
Marshaling Statement):
1.

The children never held jobs that would enable them to earn
funds in the amounts deposited in the accounts. R.631.

2.

The wife never gave the children gifts of $70,000 to
$90,000. R.631.

3.

The wife never had any discussions with the husband about
giving thousands of dollars to the children to be placed in
the accounts. R.631.

4.

The wife was not aware that there was an account at Dean
Witter in Nicole's name for approximately $70,000 prior to
the separation. R.632.

5.

The wife was not aware that there was an account at Dean
Witter in Lon's name for approximately $83,000 prior to
the separation. R.632.
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6.

The wife was not aware that there was an account at
Shearson in Nicole's name for $25,000 prior to the
separation. R.632.

7.

The wife learned about these accounts through discovery.
R.632.

8.

She did not see the children's tax returns until they were
produced in the course of discovery. R.741.

When recalled in rebuttal at the end of the trial, the wife further testified:
9.

"In the beginning of the marriage" the husband discussed
with her putting money away in accounts for the children
in "small amounts, but never the large amounts that are in
those accounts currently." R.1055.

10.

She never saw statements for the accounts, and did not
know whether they came to the house. R.1056.

There was no further evidence given by the wife on the subject of the children's
brokerage accounts. The only evidence given by the husband which might even
remotely tend to support the finding of fraud consists of the following additional
testimony:
11.

At the time of trial and for some indefinite time before that,
statements for the account were sent to a post office box,
rather than to the house, where they had been sent in the
beginning. R.1035.

12.

The children signed their own tax returns [which showed
earningsfromthe brokerage accounts]. R. 1036.
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There were no other witnesses who gave any evidence which might support the
finding of fraud. The only documentary evidence in support of the finding consists
of brokerage account statements from 1993 which show that they were addressed to
the husband, as custodian for the children, at a post office box. See Defendant's
Exhibits 29-32.
Of the evidence thus marshaled on the subject of the children's brokerage
accounts only the change of address could have any bearing on the issue of fraud, and
that being the case, the court's finding must fail.
3.

The facts so marshaled do not establish the elements of fraud by clear and

convincing evidence. The language of the district court's finding appears to consider
the husband's deposits to the minor children's brokerage accounts as a species of
fraudulent transfer. Both common law fraud and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1-25-6-13 (1989) require proof of the various elements
offraud,including an intent to deceive or conceal. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers,
871 P.2d 1041,1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5. Fraud must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. Andalex Resources at 871 P.2d 1046;
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.f 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991); Pace v. Parrish, 122
Utah 141, 143, 247 P.2d 273, 274 (1952).
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There is in the record a complete failure of proof of the elements of fraud,
particularly the element of intent, either by clear and convincing evidence or by any
other standard of pursuasion. By her own admission, the wife knew of (or, at a
minimum, had actual notice of the husband's plans to establish) the accounts, having
testified in response to her own counsel's question that the husband had discussed with
her putting away money in accounts for the children. R.1055-1056. Deposits to the
accounts took place over approximately thirteen years, and commenced long before
the breakdown of the marriage. R.999, 1033-1036. The record is devoid of any
evidence that the wife ever attempted to determine the size of those accounts, that the
husband ever refused to disclose to her that information, that he ever misrepresented
to her (or concealed) material facts regarding the accounts, that he did so for the
purpose of inducing her to act in reliance on any such misrepresentation (i.e., that he
acted intentionally), or that in reliance on any misrepresented fact (or the nonexistence of any concealed fact) she acted to her injury or damage. Intent to deceive,
in particular, "must be established by more than doubtful, vague, speculative or
inconclusive evidence." Andalex Resources, 871 P.2d 1041.
Necessary proof of the elements of fraud, intent in particular, was simply never
the subject of any testimony by any witness. The facts in evidence are, however,
entirely consistent with a methodical effort by a prudent and loving father over a
21

period of years to provide for his children. Thus, the accounts were first set up in
1980; and, although the funds in the accounts eventually aggregated approximately
$145,000, the husband's contributions in no year exceeded the $10,000 threshhold per
recipient which would have triggered a duty to file a federal gift tax return. R.999,
1048.
Given the paucity of positive evidence of fraud, particularly any evidence of
intent to conceal marital assets, and given the clear evidence of a consistent program,
carried out over a long period of years prior to the breakdown of the marriage, to
provide independent sources of wealth and income for the children, the record falls
far short of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the husband's transfers
to the children's accounts were fraudulent.
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CONCLUSION
The district court's inclusion of the husband's retirement benefits in the marital
estate, including those which substitute for social security, while excluding the wife's
social security benefits, was an egregious violation of the Utah policy of equitable
distribution of marital property. Equally egregious was the court's annihilation, in the
absence of the children, of their property rights in completed gifts made over a period
of thirteen years prior to the breakdown of the marriage.
The division of the marital estate resulting from court's erroneous inclusion of
appellant's entire Section 401(a) Plan benefits (in excess of $200,000) and the
children's brokerage accounts ($145,000) had an impact of such a magnitude as to
require not only that the inclusion of those amounts be reversed, but that the
distribution of the entire estate be reconsidered.
Accordingly, appellant requests that this case be remanded to the district court
for a new trial on the issue of distribution of the marital estate. Appellant further
requests that the district court be directed to include in the marital estate only that
portion of appellant's Section 401(a) Plan benefits as exceeds the value of social
security benefits to which he would be otherwise entitled, and that the distribution of
those benefits be deferred until contingencies as to their amount and timing have been
resolved. Finally, appellant prays that the district court be directed that it may not
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enter any order or judgment terminating or otherwise affecting the riglits of the minor
children in property which was the subject of gifts completed prior to any such order
or judgment, unless and until the children are joined as parties, separately represented
by counsel and a full evidentiary hearing held.
DATED this

day of October, 1994.
CAMPpaLMAACK&

Jay W Butler
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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Clark W. Sessions (2914)
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Tab A

ADDENDA
Addendum A: Determinative Constitutional Provisions and Rule
Constitution of the United States, Amendment V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(a):
A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court
shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a
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plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant,
or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from
the action.
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ADDENDUM B

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo—
RUTH ANN JEFFERIES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 924701612DA

WILBUR R. JEFFERIES,

Judge: Rodney S. Page

Defendant

—oooOOOooo—
The above-entitled matter came before the court, the Honorable Rodney
S. Page presiding for trial on the 9th and 10th of December, 1993, and closing argument
on December 15, 1993. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel,
David S. Dolowitz.

The Defendant was present in person represented by counsel

Rodney R. Parker.

The court after hearing the evidence of the parties and the

arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of trial
and reserved for further ruling the issues of property division, alimony and related
matters. Having considered those matters and being fully advised in the premises, the
court issued its ruling on the 18th day of February, 1994. The court having heard the
evidence of the parties, and being fully advised in the premises and having herebefore

JUDGMENT ENTERED
BY

•TN^v
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entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this

2.

Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other

action.

on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final upon signing and
entry.
3.

Care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties is

awarded to the Defendant.
4.

The Defendant should be enjoined from planning competing activities

for the children on dates of scheduled visitation and from otherwise interfering with
visitation.
5. Visitation is something that will have to be worked out between the
Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that the children may not be
willing to go overnight, the court orders visitation every other Saturday and at least four
hours on an evening during the off weeks. Subject to the foregoing, the court orders
standard visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35.
6. By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of
Utah, the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support shall continue for each
child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly
scheduled graduating class. Income withholding provision of Utah Code Ann. 62A-11-
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401 et seq. shall apply.
7.

The Defendant shall maintain primary health insurance for the

children subject to that being available through his employment. The parties are to
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical
expenses.
8.

The Plaintiff is awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard subject to

the mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,606.00 for the reason
mat the Plaintiff is presently living in the home and the Defendant voluntarily removed
himself therefrom. Given the disparity of income between the parties, it is highly unlikely
that Plaintiff could purchase such a home on her own. Further, by allocating this equity
to the Plaintiff, it allows the Defendant to retain a greater portion of his retirement.
9.

The home of the parties on Elaine Drive is awarded to the Defendant

subject to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately
$76,120.00 for the reason that is where the Defendant and the children have been
residing since the separation. It appears to meet their needs. Given the Defendant's
income, he has the capacity to move up if he so desires.
10.
$4,100.00.

The Plaintiff is awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of

The Defendant is awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of

$2,900.00 and the 1991 Subaru and debt thereon with a net value of $600.00.
11.

The Plaintiff is awarded the airplane subject to the indebtedness
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thereon in the amount of $15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00. The Defendant is be
awarded the spare airplane engine.
12.

The Defendant is awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and the one-

forth interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the amount
of $28,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those two parcels
of $20,816.00. The Defendant is further awarded the 8.25 percent interest in the 26
acres with a net equity of $4,141.00 and the condominium purchased subsequent to the
separation which has an equity of $5,000.00.
13.

The Plaintiff is awarded the savings account at First Security Bank

in its original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit of that
account during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those sums to
pay her expenses during that period.
14.

The Plaintiff is awarded the 401(K) in the amount of $12,716.00.

15.

Each of the parties is awarded half of the sums in the Dean Witter

Reynolds account in the amount of $145,725.00 plus any accrued interest and dividends.
Any income taxes incurred as a result of this division should be born equally by the
parties.
16.

The Plaintiff is awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash value

17.

The Defendant is awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a cash value

of $775.00.

of $3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his Principal Mutual
policy with a cash value of $659.00.

00251650
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18.

The Defendant is awarded the 'Video Palace" together with the

furniture and fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness
thereon of $35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00.
19.

The court finds that the retirement program of the Defendant in the

form of a 457 plan and a 401(a) plan are substantially different from social security in
both the rate of return and the ownership interest which the Defendant has in the plans.
That ownership interest allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among
other things allows him to withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may
choose upon retirement, death or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries.
All of these benefits are substantially more favorable than the usual social security
benefits. For that reason, the court does not accord to these retirement benefits the
same protection as is required the federal law for social security. Therefore, the court
concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital property and subject to division
in this proceeding.
20.

The Defendant is awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the amount

of $233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
21.

The Plaintiff is awarded $201,000.00 of the 401(a) plan free and

clear of any claim of the Defendant and any interest or accumulation (including additional
payments) in the ratio this fund is divided until actual division occurs. These should be
passed to her by appropriate QDRO which should be entered by the court to implement
this award after entry of the decree of divorce. The Defendant is awarded $21,800.00
from the 401(a) plan free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff and any interest or
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accumulation (including additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided until actual
division occurs.
22.

The court concludes that the total value of the property previously

awarded should be approximately equal.
23.

Each of the parties is awarded those items of personal property

presently in their possession together with any furniture and fixtures. The court finds that
they are essentially equal.
24.

Each of the parties is awarded his or her own personal property and

25.

The Defendant is awarded his tools, power equipment and sporting

possessions.

goods including firearms free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
26.

The court orders that the tools and equipment used for yard care and

maintenance are to be divided equally between the parties. As an exception to the
court's ruling above, the court orders that Defendant return to the Plaintiff the electric
garage door opener, hose attachments to the vacuum, one of the computers, a CD
player and in the event that there is more than one Sega and Nintendo player, one is to
be returned to the Plaintiff.
27.

The parties are ordered to divide equally any family photographs

which they may have acquired during the course of their marriage.
28.

The court considers those items of furniture and fixtures used by the

children to be the property of the children.
29.

The court considers that the $17,000.00 initially contributed by the
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Plaintiff to the marriage and the $17,000.00 initially invested in the home purchased by
the Defendant to have become marital property. The funds have been co-mingled and
as such have lost their identity as separate premarital property. Therefore, the court
considers them as marital property in the allocation made between the parties herein.
30.

The court finds that stock given to the Plaintiff by her uncle which

has remained in her name has not been co-mingled and is her sole and separate
property and not subject to distribution.
31.

The sums in the children's names at Shearson-Lehman and Lon's

bond are awarded to the children.
32.

The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and discharge the debt due and

owing on the home in Bountiful Boulevard, including any taxes and the $15,135.00 debt
due and owing on the plane and to hold the Defendant harmless thereon.
33.

The Defendant is ordered to assume and discharge the debt and

obligation due on the home on Elaine Drive, the obligation due and owing on the
business, the balance of any sums owing on the airplane in excess of $15,135.00, the
balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan and any other debts or
obligations incurred during the course of the marriage or which he has incurred
subsequent to the day of separation. The Defendant is ordered to hold the Plaintiff
harmless thereon.
34.

The court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of additional support to

meet her monthly expenses. Although, the court finds that the Plaintiff will receive
certain interest payments from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional

00251653

support in order to meet her monthly expenses. The court concludes that in light of the
Defendant's income from the Wasatch Front Regional Council, his other investments,
child support he will be receiving and the benefits incident to the ownership of the
business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the Plaintiff by way of support. The
court therefore concludes that the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the sum
of $700.00 per month as and for alimony.
35.

The court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this

matter would be $18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the
result.

The court concludes that the Plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said

attorney's fees but is without sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial
invasion of the marital estate given her income. The court finds that the Defendant given
his superior earnings ability, has the ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he
does so in the amount of $8,750.00.
DATED this SS^day of

W\OUJ

, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

RdDNEX^S) PAGE, District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this "

"Hay of May,

1994, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to the following
individual:
Rodney R. Parker, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Counsel for Defendant
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RUTH ANN JEFFERIES,
Plaintiff,

—oooOOOooo—
)
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

) Civil No. 924701612DA

WILBUR R. JEFFERIES,

) Judge: Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

)
—oooOOOooo—

The above-entitled matter came before the court, the Honorable Rodney
S. Page presiding for trial on the 9th and 10th day of December, 1993, with the closing
argument on December 15, 1993. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The Defendant was present in person represented by
counsel Rodney R. Parker. The court after hearing the evidence of the parties and the
arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of trial
and reserved for further ruling the issues of property division, alimony and related
matters. Having considered those matters and being fully advised in the premises, the
court issued its ruling on the 18th day of February, 1994. Accordingly, the court makes

and enters the following as its

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff was a resident of Davis County, State of Utah the date

this action was filed and had been so for more than three (3) months immediately prior
thereto.
2.

The parties are husband and wife having been married November

3.

Irreconcilable differences arose between the parties which made

10, 1973.

continuation of their marriage relationship impossible.
4.

Two children were born as issue of this marriage, Nicole L. Jefferies,

born on January 7, 1977, and Lon Mark Jefferies, born May 7, 1980. Pursuant to the
stipulation of the parties, care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties
should be awarded to the Defendant subject to reasonable visitation as that is defined
in Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35. Provided, however, the relationship between the
children and Plaintiff is strained. For that reason, visitation is something that will have
to be worked out between Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that
the children may not be willing to go to stay over night, the court orders visitation every
other Saturday and at least four hours on an evening during the off week.
5.

The court finds that Mr. Jefferies has, if not purposely, at least

subjectively, interfered with visitation by planning competing activities with the children
on periods of time which were designated for visitation by the children with the Plaintiff,
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and in that way, subjectively interfered with custody and the relationship between the
Plaintiff and the children.
The court also considered the purchase of the vehicle for Nicole which
encumbered the Defendant in the amount of $400.00 per month, if not outright, at least
a subtle attempt on his part to adversely influence the children against their mother.
The court further finds that the Defendant has exercised undue influence
over the children in order to gain their favor by the purchase of the piano, which was
entirely inappropriate given the temporary status of this matter, and the fact that the
child, Nicole, was primarily concerned with the violin during this period of time. It also
served to divert assets of the marriage.
6.

The Defendant should be enjoined and prohibited from planning

activities with the children which compete with their visitation with their mother and from
otherwise interfering with visitation.
7.

The Plaintiff is employed with the Utah State Tax Commission and

earns an income of approximately $2,246.00 per month and receives $300.00 per month
from a rental of a room in her home and will also receive approximately $300.00 per
month interest income from the cash awarded her in this action.
8. The Defendant is employed with Wasatch Front Regional Council and
is paid a salary of $72,000.00 annually with a gross income of approximately $6,000.00
per month.
9.

The court finds that through their employment, both parties may

maintain health and accident insurance on the children. The court determines that the
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Defendant should maintain the primary health and accident insurance on the minor
children subject to that being available through his employment and the parties are to
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical
expenses.
10.

By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State

of Utah, the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support should continue for each
child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly
scheduled graduating class.
11.

Both parties were employed prior to the marriage and acquired

property which they brought into the marriage in the form of savings. The Plaintiff
brought in $17,000.00 to $18,000.00 into the marriage and these funds were used to
purchase the home on Elaine Drive and for other family expenses.
12.

Approximately one month prior to the marriage of the parties,

Defendant purchased a home for $39,200.00. He used $17,000.00 of his premarital
funds as a down payment on this home. He took title to this property in his name alone.
The home on 1062 East 2200 South purchased by the Defendant prior to the marriage
of the parties remained in his name. The mortgage payments and upkeep were paid
for from marital funds throughout the marriage of the parties. In 1981 this original home
was sold for $100,420.00 to the "Dones". As part of the purchase price, the Buyers
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conveyed two lots to the Defendant and paid $18,000.00 in cash. The Buyers also
assumed the mortgage for approximately $18,000.00. Two lots were conveyed to the
Defendant in his name (Lot 28 and Lot 52 of Quail Brook) Lot 28 was valued at
$24,000.00. Lot 52 was valued at $38,000.00. Pursuant to agreement, Defendant sold
Lot 28 back to the "Dones" on June 3, 1982 for $20,300.00 and subsequently sold Lot
52 for $29,000.00 on March 3, 1988 to "Dubach" for $15,000.00 down and $14,000.00
with interest within one year. There was no evidence produced as to what happened
with the proceeds of sale of the home in 1981 or the sale of two perspective lots. There
is no evidence that the funds went into any surplus accounts or were traceable to certain
assets so as to maintain their separate identity.
13.

Prior to her marriage to the Defendant, Plaintiff received a gift of

certain stock (a mutual fund) from her uncle. That stock has remained intact and in her
name. The parties have done nothing with that particular asset during the course of their
marriage.
14.
marriage:

The parties own two homes which they purchased during their

3730 South Bountiful Boulevard and 2267 Elaine Drive in Bountiful, Utah.

Parties purchased the home on Elaine Drive as an investment in 1974 and used the
same as a rental property until October of 1992 when the Defendant and the children
moved into it. The home at 3730 South Bountiful Boulevard was purchased in 1981 and
was the family's home at the time that this action was filed. The Defendant and children
voluntarily moved from the home on Bountiful Boulevard before this action was filed and
moved into the home on Elaine Drive. The Plaintiff has continued to reside in the

5

Bountiful Boulevard home and the Defendant and two children in the Elaine Drive home
throughout the pendency of these proceedings. The children continue to attend the
schools that they attended when they lived in the Bountiful Boulevard home.
15.

The home on Bountiful Blvd. is the larger of the two homes. It has

an appraised value of $225,000.00 with a mortgage balance of $61,394.00 leaving an
equity of $163,606.00.
16.

The home on Elaine Drive was appraised at $113,000.00.

It is

subject to a mortgage of $36,880.00 leaving an equity of $76,120.00.
17.

Each of the parties have vehicles. The Plaintiff has a 1987 Subaru

Wagon valued at $4,100.00. The Defendant has a 1986 Olds Toronado valued at
$2,900.00 after deducting a sum required to repair certain body damage. The Defendant
has also purchased a 1991 Subaru Sedan valued at $11,200.00 with a loan balance of
approximately $10,600.00.
18.

The parties have an airplane which they own as part of a business

known as Flying Start. The parties have agreed the plane has a value of $55,453.00.
They have also agreed that the plane should be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to an
obligation on it of $15,135.00 leaving a net value on the plane of approximately
$40,318.00. There is also a spare airplane engine worth approximately $200.00 as
parts.
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During the course of the marriage, the Defendant has been part of

an investment group that has purchased interests in real estate. In so doing, he has
acquired a one-third interest in 9.69 acres in Salt Lake County; and an 8.25 percent
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interest in approximately 26 acres in Salt Lake County; and a one-forth interest in certain
property known as the Jordan Heights property in Salt Lake County. The value of the
9.69 acres is $68,000.00 and the interest of the Defendant is $22,966.00. The value of
the 26 acres in which the Defendant has an 8.25 percent interest is $50,200.00 and the
interest of the Defendant is $4,141.00. The value of the Jordan Heights Partnership
property is $103,400.00, and the Defendant's one-quarter interest is worth $25,850.00.
20.

The courtfindsthe Defendant borrowed some $32,000.00 from the

Oswald Profit Sharing Plan to repay certain credit lines in connection with the video
business and the Flying Start Company in 1992. To secure payment of those funds, the
Defendant gave a trust deed not secured by the 9.69 acres and pledged his interest in
the Jordan Heights Partnership. The note was amortized over 9 years and remains in
the balance of approximately $28,000.00 owing. Deducing the balance owing on the
note from the Defendant's interest in the 9.69 acres and the Jordan Heights Partnership,
leaves a net value on those properties of approximately $20,816.00.
21.

The courtfindsthe Defendant's partners in the land ventures appear

to be accommodating, allowing him to use his interest to secure loans and to have the
same investment and ownership goals as the Defendant. Therefore, the court does not
discount the value of these properties because of the Defendant's minority interest
therein. Further the courtfindsthese values were established by valuation for property
tax purposes. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that traditionally these values
are at least ten percent below fair market value. The courtfindsany difference in value
caused by the Defendant's minority interest is more than offset by the actual value of
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these properties.
22.

The Defendant purchased a condominium in March, 1992. The court

finds he has equity of $5,000.00 in that condominium.
23.

At the time of the separation the parties had a savings account with

First Security Bank with a balance of $10,995.00. The Plaintiff has used that account
for her benefit during the pendency of this matter.
24.

The Plaintiff has a 401K Plan with a value of $12,716.00.

25.

During the marriage, approximately $145,725.00 was placed in

accounts at Dean Witter Reynolds in the children's names pursuant to the Uniform Gift
to Minors Act.

The court has determined that those deposits were made by the

Defendant without the knowledge of the Plaintiff. They were fraudulent and were an
attempt by the Defendant to hide assets from the Plaintiff and transfer them to the
parties' children under his control. As such they were fraudulent, not only upon the
Plaintiff, but also upon the marital estate. These transfers are void and the monies are
considered to be and are ruled to be part of the marital estate.
26.

While the parties were married, savings accounts have been set up

in the childrens' names at Shearson Lehman. These accounts have been funded
primarily from earnings of the children while working in the family business and from
various gifts they have received. A total of $20,448.00 has been paid to Nicole from the
business from 1988 - 1992 and there has been a total of approximately $22,664.00
deposited in her Shearson Lehman account over that same period. Lon over the same
period has been paid approximately $20,453.00 and approximately $23,395.00 has been
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deposited in his account at Shearson Lehman during the period. Those sums which
were deposited in the Shearson Lehman accounts constitute the majority of the earnings
which the children have had during that period of time. There may have been some
other incidental amounts which have been deposited.
The Defendant withdrew $15,000.00 from Nicole's account supposedly in
conjunction with her in the purchase of the condominium. This is a matter between the
Defendant and Nicole.
A $7,000.00 amount was withdrawn from Lon's account in 1991, and a
bond was purchased at Dean Witter Reynolds. The bond which can be traced from the
$7,000.00 withdrawal is Lon's separate property.
27.

The Defendant has various life insurance policies on his life which

have accumulated a cash value.

The beneficial life policy has a cash value of

$3,399.00. A Penn Life policy has a cash value of $700.00 and a Principal Mutual policy
has a cash value of $659.00.
28.

The Plaintiff has a life insurance with Beneficial Life with a cash

value of approximately $775.00.
29.

There are life insurance policies on the children with accumulated

cash values, which are the property of the children.
30.

The Wasatch Front Regional Council has opted out of the social

security systems, so they have a separate retirement system for their employees. The
system provides for retirement by allowing the employees to invest in a 457 Plan, which
is administered by the State of Utah. In addition, the Wasatch Front Regional Council
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contributes a matching amount into a separate plan known as the 401(a) which is
administered by Principle Financial. The retirement plans provide many advantages over
social security. Under the 457 Plan, all funds accumulated are paid to the employee
upon termination of employment, death, disability or unforseen severe financial
emergencies. The recipient, upon retirement can elect a lump-sum distribution, periodic
payment or certain other alternatives. Under the 401(a) Plan, the employer makes a
contribution on behalf of the employee, however, the employee can also make voluntary
contributions. The contributions made by the employer are totally vested upon death,
retirement, or termination. The employee has several options for payout including lumpsum. Under this Plan any contributions made by the employee may be withdrawn at any
time, but withdrawal prior to age 59 1/2 may be subject to a ten percent penalty by the
Internal Revenue Service. Under either of the Plans, all funds in the accounts may be
passed to beneficiary upon property designation.

The Defendant presently has

$233,412.00 in his 457 Plan and $222,800.00 in his 401(a) Plan. All sums were
accumulated during the marriage.
31.

The Plaintiff has minimal state retirement; having drawn out some

$30,800.00 in January of 1981 to apply toward the purchase of the parties' home.
32.

The Plaintiff has some social security eligibility.

33.

In 1986 the parties opened a business known as the "Video Palace".

Over the years the children have worked in the business and the earnings therefrom,
were the primary source of the children's savings accounts in Shearson Lehman. The
business has been operating for 7 years and has provided income to the parties. The
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assets of the business, in addition to actual videos themselves, consist of certain
computer equipment, a 1983 Dodge Van, and a hot air balloon. Various experts were
called to evaluate the business. These valuations ranged from a low of $30,000.00 to
$35,000.00 to a high of $169,000.00. The method of depreciation is the crucial factor
in valuation. It has a profound effect on the cashflowfor valuation purposes. Too rapid
a depreciation rate tends to underestimate cash flow and too slow a method, tends to
over-state it.

For obvious reasons, the Plaintiffs experts opted for the slowest

depreciation rate and the Defendant's were the fastest. The court would find the most
reasonable depreciation rate would be the one nearer the faster rate allowed by the
Internal Revenue Service's regulations. The court finds that the fair market value
established by the Defendant's expert of $30,000.00, does not fairly take into
consideration the history of the business and its performance over time and is more a
liquidation sale price than the sale price of a going concern. From the evidence the
court finds a fair market value of the business is approximately $100,000.00. There is
owing on the business an obligation in the amount of $35,000.00 to First Security Bank.
The court therefore finds the net value of the business is $65,000.00.
34.

The court does not consider the transaction between the Video

Palace and Ms. Stein in 1993 to have been an arms length transaction and therefore the
court has not considered that for valuation purposes.
35.

The court finds that in addition to the monies paid to the children,

family expenses have been paid from the business and that family expenses for other
household supplies, food, transportation and entertainment have been subsidized by the
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business.
36.

The court finds that each of the parties had in their possession

certain furniture and fixtures. The court is unable, based on the evidence, to value these
items.
37.

The court does find that the parlor grand piano in the Plaintiffs

possession was purchased with funds given to her by her parents and is thus a gift from
them. It is not part of the marital estate.
38.

The courtfindsduring the course of the marriage, the Defendant has

acquired certain tools, equipment, personal property and firearms.
39.

The courtfindsthe parties have incurred debts during the course of

the marriage, to-wit: a mortgage on each of the homes, a balance due and owing on the
Video Palace business, a balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing Plan, the
obligation due on the airplane in the business known as Flying Start, taxes owing on the
Bountiful Blvd. home, the debts the Defendant has incurred since separation to Zions on
the piano and car purchased for Nicole.
40.

The court finds neither of these parties will be able to maintain the

same standard of living that was available while they were residing together. The court
finds that the Plaintiffs requested expenses are unreasonable regarding, the amount that
she claimed for tuition when the court sees no real advantage to additional education,
for entertainment expenses in excess of $100.00 per month, for the children's expenses
in the amount of $200.00 per month in light of her obligation to pay child support and for
vacation expenses of $150.00 per month. Taking these into consideration, the court
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finds the Plaintiff has reasonable expenses of $2,724.00 per month.
41.

The court finds the expenses claimed by the Defendant are

unreasonable, that food expense for 3 people in excess of $400.00 per month is
excessive, particularly in light of the court's finding that the cost of food, household
supplies, transportation and expenses are subsidized to some extent by the Video
Palace as valid business expenses, the clothing expense, in excess of $100.00 per
month is also unreasonable, as is a dental and medical expense of $150.00 per month
where each of the parties carry health and dental insurance. Entertainment expenses
in excess of $100.00 per month is also unreasonable given the manner in which the
business expenses are handled. The court further finds the obligation on Nicole's car
is a voluntary obligation incurred by the Defendant after separation and that any sum for
Nicole's car in excess of $175.00 per month is excessive, given the circumstances of
these parties. The court furtherfindsthat the deduction of $400.00 per month for a new
car for the Defendant is also excessive given the circumstances of the parties. The
court further excludes the payment to Zions Bank for the piano which was purchased
after the date of separation, the court considers it frivolous. The court furtherfindsthat
a claim of $150.00 per month for allowances for the children is unreasonable in light of
their history of employment with the business. The mortgage payment claimed by the
Defendant is in excess to the sum of $483.00 per month (based on the award of the
property made by the court).

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court finds a

reasonable expense for the Defendant is approximately $4,000.00 per month.
42.

The Plaintiff has a net income of $1,588.00 per month plus $300.00
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from a rental of a room in the home. In addition, she should receive approximately
$300.00 per month in interest income from funds that the court has determined it will
award to her. Even with this income, the court has found that she is without sufficient
funds to meet her reasonable expenses.
43.

The court has determined the Defendant has wages of $6,000.00 per

month with a net income of $4,500.00 to $4,700.00 per month, not including monies
which he is able to receive from the business or money that he saves by subsidizing
family obligations through business expenses. In addition, he will have child support
from the Plaintiff in the sum of approximately $300.00 per month.
44.

The Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of $20,653.00 based on

a total of 165 hours attributed by counsel and co-counsel.
45.

The court finds the Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees of

approximately $30,000.00 based on 319 hours having been contributed by two attorneys
and two paralegals. Mrs. Jefferies did much of the computations as to the graphs and
business expenses offered into evidence by the Plaintiff.
46.

The court finds that this case was not extremely complicated, it did

have certain novel issues as to the retirement and unusual factual issues regarding the
family business and its value. However, the courtfindsthat to have spent 319 hours on
this particular case is unreasonable. The court finds that given the complexity of the
case, the nature of the issues, the results obtained, that 150 hours is a reasonable
amount of time to be spent on this case by an attorney who is knowledgeable in the area
of domestic relations as these two attorneys are. A reasonable attorney's fee would be
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$125.00 per hour.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the
following
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this

2.

Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the

action.

other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences the same to become final upon signing
and entry.
3.

The care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties

should be awarded to the Defendant as stipulated by the parties.
4.

The Defendant should be enjoined from planning competing activities

for the children on dates of scheduled visitation and from otherwise interfering with
visitation.
5. Visitation is something that will have to be worked out between the
Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that the children may not be
willing to go overnight, the court orders visitation every other Saturday and at least four
hours on an evening during the off weeks. Subject to the foregoing, the court orders
standard visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35.
6. By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of
Utah, the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support should continue for each
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child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly
scheduled graduating class. Income withholding provision of Utah Code Ann. 62A-11401 et sea, shall apply.
7.

The Defendant should maintain primary health insurance for the

children subject to that being available through his employment. The parties are to
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical
expenses.
8.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard

subject to the mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,6606.00
for the reason that the Plaintiff is presently living in the home and the Defendant
voluntarily removed himself therefrom.

Given the disparity of income between the

parties, it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff could purchase such a home on her own.
Further, by allocating this equity to the Plaintiff, it allows the Defendant to retain a
greater portion of his retirement.
9.

The home of the parties on Elaine Drive should be awarded to the

Defendant subject to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately
$76,120.00 for the reason that is where the Defendant and the children have been
residing since the separation. It appears to meet their needs. Given the Defendant's
income, he has the capacity to move up if he so desires.
10.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of
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$4,100.00. The Defendant should be awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of
$2,900.00 and the 1991 Subaru and debt thereon with a net value of $600.00.
11.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the airplane subject to the

indebtedness thereon in the amount of $15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00. The
Defendant should be awarded the spare airplane engine.
12.
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The Defendant should be awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and
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the one-forth interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the
amount of $28,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those
two parcels of $20,816.00. The Defendant should be further awarded the 8.25 percent
interest in the 26 acres with a net equity of $4,141.00 and the condominium purchased
subsequent to the separation which has an equity of $5,000.00.
13.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the savings account at First Security

Bank in its original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit
of that account during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those
sums to pay her expenses during that period.
14.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the 401 (K) in the amount of

15.

Each of the parties should be awarded half of the sums in the Dean

$12,716.00.

Witter Reynolds account in the amount of $145,725.00 plus any accrued interest and
dividends. Any income taxes incurred as a result of this division should be born equally
by the parties.
16.

The Plaintiff should be awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash
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value of $775.00.
17.

The Defendant should be awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a

cash value of $3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his
Principal Mutual policy with a cash value of $659.00.
18.

The Defendant should be awarded the "Video Palace" together with

the furniture and fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness
thereon of $35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00.
19.

The court finds that the retirement program of the Defendant in the

form of a 457 plan and a 401(a) plan are substantially different from social security in
both the rate of return and the ownership interest which the Defendant has in the plans.
That ownership interest allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among
other things allows him to withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may
choose upon retirement, death or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries.
All of these benefits are substantially more favorable than the usual social security
benefits. For that reason, the court does not accord to these retirement benefits the
same protection as is required the federal law for social security. Therefore, the court
concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital property and subject to division
in this proceeding.
20.

The Defendant should be awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the

amount of $233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
21.

The Plaintiff should be awarded $201,000.00 of the 401(a) plan free

and clear of any claim of the Defendant and any interest or accumulation (including
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subsequent to the day of separation. The Defendant should be ordered to hold the
Plaintiff harmless thereon.
34.

The court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of additional support to

meet her monthly expenses.

Although, the court finds that the Plaintiff will receive

certain interest payments from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional
support in order to meet her monthly expenses. The court concludes that in light of the
Defendant's income from the Wasatch Front Regional Council, his other investments,
child support he will be receiving and the benefits incident to the ownership of the
business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the Plaintiff by way of support. The
court therefore concludes that the Defendant should be ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the
sum of $700.00 per month as and for alimony.
35.

The court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this

matter would be $18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the
result.

The court concludes that the Plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said

attorney's fees but is without sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial
invasion of the marital estate given her income. The court finds that the Defendant given
his superior earnings ability, has the ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he
does so in the amount of $8,750.00.
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DATED this ^s^dav of

YWaM-

1994.

BY THE COURT:

Ta</V—

RODNEY£j PAGE, Distric
District
Court Judge
istrici Coi
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this

'

day of May,

1994 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
to the following individual:
Rodney R. Parker, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Counsel for Defendant
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Addendum D: Extracts from Record Referred to in Marshaling Statement
Testimony of Ruth Ann Jefferies, R.631-632:
7

Q.

(BY MR. DOLOWITZ) Then on the next page you heard us

8

enter into stipulations regarding the Dean Witter accounts, and

9

there's the Prudential* account.

10

Do you believe those are

accounts that actually belong to the children?

11

A.

The Dean Witter and the Shearson Lehman accounts

12

are in the children's names, but I don't believe they belong

13

to the children.

14

Q.

Did the children ever get money that would give

15

them 70,000 or 84 or 90,000 some odd dollars each?

16

ever held any kind of job that would give them that?

Have they

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Have you ever given them a gift of that size?

19

A.

I never had that kind of money in my life all at

20 one time.
21

Q.

Have you ever had any discussions with

22 Mr. Jefferies about giving thousands of dollars to the
23

children by placing them in accounts?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Were you aware that there was a Dean Witter

[R.632]
1

account in Nicole's name for approximately $70,000 prior to

2

separation?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Were you aware of there being a Dean Witter

5

account with $83,000 in it prior to your separation, in Lon's

6

name?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Were you aware of a Shearson account in Nicole's

9

name of $16,000 prior to separation?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Were you aware of a Shearson account in Lon's

12

name for $25,000 prior to separation?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

How did you learn about these accounts?

15

A.

Through discovery.

Testimony of Wilburn Jefferies, R.998-1000.
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Q.

(BY MR. PARKER) All right.

Now, there are listed on

22

the second page of Exhibit 14 gifts to minors accounts, two in

23

the name of Nicole and two in the name of Lon. Do you see those?

24

A.

I do.

25

Q.

And the values of those are stipulated, I

[R.999]
1

believe.

2

those accounts, if you would.

3

A.

Tell us the background behind the setting up of

The ones at Shearson Lehman were set up, I

4

believe, in 1980.

5

something like that.

6

some difficulty in a previous appearance over ownership of

7

certain accounts of the children.

8

back into the

9

accounts at Shearson, and Nicole and Lonnie had savings

f

I can't remember the date, mid eighties or

80 f s.

They were used -- we talked here about

So we set up these two gift to minors

10 -accounts at a savings and loan.
11

accounts.

That difficulty went

We emptied out those

They each had a number of accounts, and I can't

12

remember which one we emptied out and put them into the

13

Shearson account,

14

Since then, any gifts that the children receive

15

from relatives or anybody else, any money that they earn one

16

way or another, including, I think every dollar that they

17

earn through a wage at Video Palace has been put into this

18

account.

19

account they have, including interest on the bonds, which

20

transferred over to this account, that becomes their liquid

21

cash account intended to be used fully for their education.

22

Also, any interest they received on any kind of

The other two accounts grew out of my

23

relationship with a number of bond lawyers and investment

24

bankers who told me the best way to provide —

25

way they provided an education for their children was to buy

told me the

[R.1000]
1

bonds, and they recommended tax exempt municipal bonds and

2

use those bonds for their education, so we set up the other

3

accounts for the purchase of bonds, and the four accounts

4

together intended to —

5

resources we can acquire, either through the video store, the

6

condominium or are other investments, to pay the future

7

education of the two children.

together with whatever other

8

Q.

Are you the custodian of those accounts?

9

A.

I am.

10

Q.

For the benefit of the children?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Are the assets in the account yours?

13

A.

They belong to each other.

Testimony of Wilburn Jefferies, R. 1033-1036
21

Q.

(BY MR. DOLOWITZ) As I recall there is presently two

22

accounts which you say are the -- as I recall your testimony,

23

are the children's accounts at Shearson Lehman.

24

has $16,042 in that account, and she has a Dean Witter account

25

of $69,289.

Where did those —

You say Nicole

how are those funds accumulated?

[R.1034]
1

A.

As I testified, some of it was transferred from

2

another savings account, some of it was gifts and

3

contributions by other people, money they earned, interest on

4

investments and things like that.

5
6

Q.

Isn't it, in fact, money you placed in those

accounts?

7

A.

To the extent that I paid them for wages or made

8

contributions to their other accounts that were transferred

9

over, yes.

10
11

A.

They were included on the income tax filings

which she signed every year.

14
15

You never told Ruth Ann about those accounts, did

you?

12
13

Q.

Q.

You never told Ruth Ann about those accounts, did

A.

Yes, she knew about them.

you?

16

The statements came to

17

the house.

18

accountant and reviewed them all before signing them.

19

She signed the income tax statement with our

Q.

You never told Ruth Ann about those accounts, did

A.

Yes, I did.

20 "you?
21

22

Q.

There's an account in Lon's name at Dean Witter

23

for $83,437 and in Shearson Lehman for $25,084*

Lon shows,

24

if we look at his wage for his 1988, $2,560; for 1989,

25

$3,020; for 1990, $4,615; for 1991, $5,625; for 1992, $4,966.

[R.1035]
1

You're saying that he was able to accumulate those accounts

2

on those kinds of earnings?

3

A.

As I testified to, contributions in those

4

accounts came from a number of sources, including transfers

5

from other savings accounts and contributions by relatives

6

and friends, as well as wages they earned either at the Video

7

Palace or elsewhere, together with and on their investments.

8
9
10

Q.

Now, you had or we stipulated into evidence

Exhibit 29, which is the Nicole Jefferies account.

What is

the mailing address for that account?

11

A,

It's currently post office box 770.

12

Q.

It was the post office box throughout the

13

marriage, wasn't it?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Those did not come to the home, did they?

16

A,

I believe when the accounts were first opened,

17
18
19

they did.
Q.

Let's go to Exhibit 30. What's the mailing

address for that statement?

20

A.

It's the same.

21

Q.

Let's go to Exhibit 31, what's the address there?

22

A.

It's the same.

23

Q.

Exhibit 32.

24

A.

It's the same.

25

Q.

They all come to a post office box?

1

A.

They do currently.

2

Q.

And they did, didn't they, throughout the time

[R.1036]

3

you've had these accounts?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

You signed off on the children's tax returns,

6

didn't you?

7

A.

I don't know what you mean by "signed off."

8

Q.

That information wasn't disclosed to Ruth Ann,

9
10

was it?
A.

I think Ruth Ann had all the tax returns from the

11

children.

12

our returns with our accountant, Mike Jones.

13

Q.

We did the children's return statements, we did

Again, you never told Ruth Ann that those

14

accounts with these thousands of dollars existed for the

15

children, did you?

16

MR. PARKER:

17

THE COURT:

I object now.

It's been answered.

18

was a question I want answered.

19

their return.

20

Q.

21

It's repetitive.

(BY MR. DOLOWITZ)

I think there

I want to know who signed

Who signed the children's tax

return?

22

A.

They each signed their own.

23

Q.

Ruth Ann did not sign those returns, then?

24

A.

They each signed their own.

Exchange between court and counsel for husband, R.1048.
18
19

THE COURT:

I have just one question.

Were any

gift tax returns filed in connection with the gifts to

20 minors?
21

MR. PARKER:

My understanding is, and I may not

22

be the right person, was that the —

23

they were below the $10,000 threshold per person.

24

THE COURT: All right.

25

MR. PARKER:

as the gifts were made,

So the answer would be no.

Testimony of Ruth Ann Jefferies, R.1055-1056:
21
22

Q.

away in accounts for children with you?

23
24

(BY MR. DOLOWITZ) Did Wil ever discuss putting money

A.

In the beginning of the marriage, small amounts,

but never the large amounts that are in those accounts

25 currently.
[R.1056]
1
2

Q.

Did you ever see statements coming in from

Shearson Lehman or Dean Witter?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Do you know if they came to the house?

5

A.

Not to my knowledge.

